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Abstract—We present a framework by which websites can
coordinate to make it difficult for users to set similar passwords
at these websites, in an effort to break the culture of password
reuse on the web today. Though the design of such a framework
is fraught with risks to users’ security and privacy, we show that
these risks can be effectively mitigated through careful scoping
of the goals for such a framework and through principled design.
At the core of our framework is a private set-membership-
test protocol that enables one website to determine, upon a
user setting a password for use at it, whether that user has
already set a similar password at another website, but with
neither side disclosing to the other the password(s) it employs
in the protocol. Our framework then layers over this protocol a
collection of techniques to mitigate the leakage necessitated by
such a test. These mechanisms are consistent with common user
experience today, and so our framework should be unobtrusive
to users who do not reuse similar passwords across websites
(e.g., due to having adopted a password manager). Through
a working implementation of our framework and optimization
of its parameters based on insights of how passwords tend to
be reused, we show that our design can meet the scalability
challenges facing such a service.
I. INTRODUCTION
The reuse of passwords is the No. 1 cause of harm
on the internet.
– Facebook CSO Alex Stamos [1]
Password reuse across websites remains a dire problem
despite widespread advice for users to avoid it. Numerous
surveys and studies over the past fifteen years indicate that
75%–93% of users set the same or similar passwords across
different websites (e.g., [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]). As such,
breaches of a password database or a successful phish of a
user’s password can often lead to the compromise of user
accounts on other websites. Such “credential-stuffing” attacks
are a primary cause of account takeovers [8], [9], allowing
the attacker to drain stolen accounts of stored value, credit
card numbers, and other personal information [9]. Moreover,
this problem seems to be on the rise, with incidences of such
attacks rising by 35% in the first quarter of 2016 alone [10].
Somewhat ironically, increasingly stringent password require-
ments contribute to password reuse, as users reuse strong
passwords across websites to cope with the cognitive burden
of creating and remembering them [11].
It is tempting to view password reuse as a mistake whose
costs are borne only by those users who do, in fact, reuse
passwords. However, preventing, detecting, and cleaning up
compromised accounts and the value thus stolen is a significant
cost for service providers, as well. A recent Ponemon sur-
vey [12] of 569 IT security practitioners who are responsible
for the security of their companies’ websites estimated that
credential-stuffing attacks incur costs in terms of application
downtime, loss of customers, and involvement of IT security
that average $1.7 million, $2.7 million and $1.6 million,
respectively, per organization per year. Some companies go
so far as to purchase compromised credentials on the black
market to find vulnerable accounts proactively, either as a
for-pay service to others (e.g., PasswordPing, https://www.
passwordping.com) or for their own users (e.g., Facebook [1]).
Beyond monitoring the black market, sites also must develop
new technologies to identify overtaken accounts based on their
use [1]. Even the sheer volume of credential-stuffing attacks is
increasingly a challenge; e.g., in November 2017, a stunning
43% (3.6 out of 8.3 billion) of all login attempts served by
Akamai involved credential abuse [13]. Finally, the aforemen-
tioned Ponemon survey estimated the fraud perpetrated using
overtaken accounts could incur average losses of up to $54
million per organization surveyed [12]. As such, interfering
with password reuse would not only better protect users, but
would also reduce the considerable costs of credential abuse
incurred by websites.
We thus argue in this paper that a technical mechanism to
prevent password reuse across websites warrants considera-
tion, and we propose and evaluate one such design here. At
a high level, the framework we explore enables a server at
which a user is setting a password, here called a requester, to
ask of other websites, here called responders, whether the user
has set a similar password at any of them. A positive answer
can then be used by the requester to ask the user to select a
different password (perhaps after suggesting alternatives that
are likely to be different from what the user might have
set elsewhere). As we will argue in Section III, enlisting a
surprisingly small number of major websites in our framework
could substantially weaken the culture of password reuse.
We are under no illusions that our design, were it deployed,
will be met with anything but contempt (at least temporar-
ily) by the many users who currently reuse passwords at
multiple websites. In this respect, the usability implications
of our proposal are not unlike increasingly stringent pass-
word requirements, to which users have nevertheless resigned.
However, options for password managers are plentiful and
growing, with a variety of trustworthiness, usability, and cost
properties (e.g., [14], [15]). Indeed, experts often list the use
of a password manager that supports a different password per
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website to be one of the best things a user can do to reduce
her online risk [6]. While there might be a category of users
who, despite having a rich online presence, cannot make use
of a password manager for some reason, we expect those
users to be few. And, of course, the old-fashioned practice
of just writing down passwords should be available to nearly
everyone who is capable of using a computer, as a last resort.
Though historically maligned, the practice of writing down
passwords is now more widely accepted, exactly because it
makes it easier to not reuse passwords (e.g., [16], [17]).
Setting aside the debate of whether to prevent password
reuse, there are many technical issues that need to be addressed
to make a framework like the one we propose palatable. First,
such a framework should not reduce the security of user
accounts. Second, the framework should also not decay user
privacy substantially, in the sense of divulging the websites at
which a user has an account. Third, it is important that the
protocol run between a requester and responders should scale
well enough to ensure that it does not impose too much delay
for setting a password at a website. As we will see, meeting
these requirements is very challenging.
Our framework addresses these challenges as follows. To
minimize risk to user accounts, we design a protocol that
enables the requester to learn if a password chosen by a user
is similar to one she set at a responder; neither side learns the
password(s) the other input to the protocol, however, even by
misbehaving. Our framework leverages this protocol, together
with other mechanisms to compensate for leakage necessitated
by the protocol’s output, to ensure that account security
and privacy is not diminished. Among other properties, this
framework ensures that the responders remain hidden from the
requester and vice-versa. Scalability is met in our framework
by carefully designing it to involve only a single round of
interaction between the requester and responders. And, using
observations about password reuse habits, we optimize our
framework to detect similar password use with near-certainty
while maximizing its scalability.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows:
• We initiate debate on the merits of preventing password
reuse on the web, through coordination among websites.
Our goal in initiating this debate is to question the zeit-
geist in the computer security community that password
reuse cannot be addressed by technical means without
imposing unduly on user security or privacy. In particular,
we show that apparent obstacles to a framework for
interfering with password reuse across websites can be
overcome through careful scoping of its goals and through
reasonable assumptions (Section III).
• We propose a protocol for privately testing set member-
ship that underlies our proposed framework (Section IV).
We prove security of our protocol in the case of a
malicious requester and against malicious responders
(Appendix A).
• We embed this protocol within a framework to facil-
itate requester-responder interactions while hiding the
identities of protocol participants and addressing risks
that cannot be addressed by—and indeed, that are ne-
cessitated by—the private set-membership-test protocol
(Section V). We evaluate implementations of our pro-
posed framework with differing degrees of trust placed
in it (Section V and Appendix B).
• Using password-reuse tendencies, we illustrate how to
configure our framework to minimize its costs while
ensuring detection of reused passwords with high likeli-
hood (Section VI). Finally, we demonstrate its scalability
through experiments with a working implementation in
deployments that capture its performance in realistic
scenarios.
II. RELATED WORK
Despite the extent of password reuse, we are aware of
no prior work to actively interfere with password reuse by
the same user at multiple websites. Instead, approaches that
implicitly or explicitly coordinate across sites to mitigate risks
due to password reuse have set somewhat different goals.
Web single sign-on: Roughly speaking, web single sign-on
(SSO) schemes such as OAuth (https://oauth.net/), OpenID
(http://openid.net), OpenID Connect (http://openid.net/
connect/), and Facebook Login (https://developers.facebook.
com/docs/facebook-login/), enable one website (an “identity
provider”) to share a user’s account information with other
websites (“relying parties”), typically in lieu of the user
creating distinct accounts at those relying parties. As such,
this approach mitigates password reuse by simply not having
the user set passwords at the relying parties. However,
if a user’s identity-provider account is compromised or
unavailable, or if she simply chooses to close her identity-
provider account, then the security or availability of her
relying-party accounts can be impacted. In addition, the
identity provider in these schemes typically learns the relying
parties visited by the user [18]. Such issues have slowed their
adoption [19].
Detecting leaked passwords: As discussed in Section I, some
companies cross-reference account passwords against leaked
passwords sold on the black market, either as a service to
others or for their own users. This approach proactively detects
risk to shared-password accounts that arises when one of those
accounts is compromised. Other approaches detect attempts
to reuse compromised passwords at honey accounts on other
sites (e.g., [20]), thereby reactively detecting risk to accounts.
Whether proactive or reactive, detecting stolen passwords is
primarily useful if at-risk accounts at other sites can be located
and protected, ideally before they are breached. In contrast, our
goal is to discourage password reuse in the first place and,
indeed, to eliminate the culture of password reuse altogether.
Prohibiting popular passwords: Schechter et al. [21] proposed
a service by which sites could check whether a password
chosen by a user is popular with other users or, more specifi-
cally, if its frequency of use exceeds a specified threshold. Our
goals here are different—we seek to detect the use of similar
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passwords by the same user at different sites, regardless of
popularity.
Limiting password-based access: Takada [22] proposed to
interfere with the misuse of accounts with shared passwords
by adding an “availability control” to password authentication.
In this design, a user disables the ability to log into her website
account at a third-party service and then re-enables it when
needed. This approach requires that the attacker be unable to
itself enable login, and so requires an additional authentication
at the third-party service to protect this enabling.
Our approach is complementary to the above approaches to
addressing password reuse, in the sense that it can be used
alongside any or all of them. Unlike the above approaches,
ours seeks to prevent the reuse of passwords by the same user
across different websites, thereby strengthening the security of
each account.
III. GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we seek to clarify the goals for our systems
and the assumptions on which our design rests.
A. Deployment Goals
It is important to recognize that in order to break the culture
of password reuse, we do not require universal adoption of
the framework we propose here. Instead, it may be enough to
enlist a (surprisingly small) number of top websites. To see
this, consider just the 20 websites listed in Table I.1 For a
back-of-the-envelope estimate, suppose that the users of each
website in Table I are sampled uniformly at random from
the 3.58 billion global Internet users.2 Then, in expectation
an Internet user would have accounts at more than four of
them. As such, if just these websites adopted our framework,
it would force a large fraction of users to manage five or
more dissimilar passwords, which is already at the limit of
what users are capable of managing themselves: “If multiple
passwords cannot be avoided, four or five is the maximum for
unrelated, regularly used passwords that users can be expected
to cope with” [23]. We thus believe that enlisting these
20 websites could already dramatically improve password-
manager adoption, and it is conceivable that with modest
additional adoption (e.g., the top 50 most popular websites),
password reuse could largely be brought to an end.
A user who resists adopting a password manager will pre-
sumably continue using similar passwords across sites that do
not participate in our framework. Each such reused password
may also be similar to one she set at a site that does participate
in our framework, but likely at only one such site. If this reused
password is compromised (e.g., due to a site breach), then the
1User counts were retrieved on April 14, 2018 from https://www.
statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-
users/, http://blog.shuttlecloud.com/the-most-popular-email-providers-in-the-
u-s-a/, https://expandedramblings.com/index.php/yahoo-statistics/, https://
expandedramblings.com/index.php/taobao-statistics/, and https://www.statista.
com/statistics/476196/number-of-active-amazon-customer-accounts-quarter/.
2Estimate of Internet users was retrieved from https://www.statista.com/
statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/ on April 14, 2018.
Website Users (M) Website Users (M)
Facebook 2167 Taobao 580
YouTube 1500 Outlook 400
WhatsApp 1300 Sina Weibo 376
Yahoo! 1000 Twitter 330
Gmail 1000 Amazon 310
WeChat 980 Baidu Tieba 300
QQ 843 LinkedIn 260
Instagram 800 Snapchat 255
Tumblr 794 Reddit 250
iCloud 782 Pinterest 200
TABLE I: Websites and counts of active users for the estimates
of Section III-A
attacker, acting as a requester in our framework, might be
able (subject to limitations imposed by mechanisms described
in Section V-A1) to confirm that this password is similar to
that set by the same user at some participating site, but not
which site (see Section III-C). If so, the attacker would need to
try this password at the user’s account blindly at participating
sites—essentially the same credential-stuffing attack that he
would mount today in the absence of our framework. However,
with the adoption of our framework, this attack would succeed
at only one participating site, not many.
B. User Identifiers
A key assumption of our framework is that there is an
identifier for a user’s accounts that is common across the
requester and responders. An email address for the user
would be a natural such identifier, and as we will describe
in Section V-A1, this has other uses in our context, as well.
Due to this assumption, however, a user could reuse the same
password across different websites, despite our framework, if
she registers a different email address for each of her accounts
at those websites.
Several methods exist for a user to amass many distinct
email addresses, but we believe they will interfere little
with our goals here. First, some email providers support
multiple addresses for a single account. For example, one
Gmail account can have arbitrarily many addresses, since
Gmail addresses are insensitive to capitalization, insertion
of periods (‘.’), or insertion of a plus (‘+’) followed by
any string, anywhere before ‘@gmail.com’. As another
example, 33mail (https://33mail.com) allows a user to receive
mail sent to <alias>@<username>.33mail.com for
any alias string. Though these providers enable a user to
provide a distinct email address to each website (e.g., [24]),
our framework could nevertheless extract a canonical identifier
for each user. For Gmail, the canonical identifier could be
obtained by normalizing capitalization and by eliminating
periods and anything between ‘+’ and ‘@gmail.com’. For
33mail, you@<username>.33mail.com should suffice.
Admittedly this requires customization specific to each such
provider domain, though this customization is simple.
Second, various hosting services permit a customer to
register a domain name and then support many email aliases
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for that domain (e.g., <alias>@<domain>.com). For ex-
ample, Google Domains (http://domains.google) supports 100
email aliases per domain. Since these domains are custom, it
might not be tractable to introduce domain-specific customiza-
tions as above. However, registering one’s own domain as a
workaround to keep using the same password across websites
presumably saves the user little effort or money (registering
domains is not free) in comparison to just switching to a
password manager. Going further, a user could manually
register numerous email accounts at free providers such as
Gmail. Again, this is presumably comparable or more effort
than alternatives that involve no password reuse. As such,
we do not concern ourselves with such methods of avoiding
password reuse detection.
This discussion highlights an important clarification regard-
ing our goals: we seek to eliminate easy methods of reusing
passwords but not ones that require similar or greater effort
from the user than more secure alternatives, of which we
take a password manager as an exemplar. That is, we do not
seek to make it impossible for a user to reuse passwords,
though we do seek to make reusing passwords about as
difficult as not reusing them. We expect that even this modest
goal, if achieved, will largely eliminate password reuse, since
passwords are reused today almost entirely for convenience.
C. Security and Privacy Goals
The goals we take as more absolute have to do with the
privacy of users and ensuring that our method of detecting
password reuse does not substantially weaken users’ accounts.
Specifically, we seek to ensure the following:
• account location privacy: Websites do not learn the
identities of other websites at which a user has set up
an account.
• account security: Our framework strengthens security
of user accounts at a site that participates in our frame-
work (as a requester and responder), by interfering with
reuse of similar passwords at other participating sites.
Moreover, it does not qualitatively degrade user account
security in other ways.
As we will see, account security is difficult to achieve, since
our framework must expose whether responders’ passwords
are similar to the one chosen by the user at the requester.
However, account location privacy hides from the requester
each responder from which the requester learns this informa-
tion. As such, if a user attempts to set the same password at
a malicious requester that she has also set at some responder,
or if a malicious requester otherwise obtains this password
(e.g., obtaining it in a breach of a non-participating site), the
malicious requester must still attempt to use that password
blindly at participating websites, just as in a credential-stuffing
attack today. (The attacker might succeed, but it would succeed
without our framework, too.) Moreover, in Section V-A1 we
will detail additional defenses against this leakage to further
reduce the risk of attacks from malicious requesters to whom
the user does not volunteer this password.
We conclude this section by summarizing some potential
goals that we (mostly) omit from consideration in this paper.
From a privacy perspective, we try to hide neither when
a password is being set at some requester for an account
identifier nor the number of responders at which an account
has been established using that account identifier, simply
because we are unaware of common scenarios in which these
leakages would have significant practical ramifications. And,
while we strive to guarantee account location privacy and
account security even against a requester and responders that
misbehave, we generally do not seek to otherwise detect that
misbehavior. So, for example, each requester and responder
has complete autonomy in determining the passwords that it
provides to the protocol as the candidate password submitted
by the user and the passwords similar to the one for the
account with the same identifier, respectively. As we will see
in Section VII, such misbehaviors can give rise to denial-of-
service opportunities, for which we propose remedies there.
IV. PRIVATELY TESTING SET MEMBERSHIP
A building block of our framework is a protocol by which
a requester can inquire with a responder as to whether a
password π chosen for an account identifier is similar to one
already in use at some responder for the same identifier. If
for an account identifier a, the responder S has a set P(a)
of passwords similar to that already set at S, then the goal of
this protocol is for the requester to learn whether the candidate
password π is in P(a). However, any additional information
leakage to the requester (about any passwords in P(a) or even
the number of passwords in P(a)) or to the responder (about
π) should be minimized.
This general specification can be met with a private set-
membership-test protocol. Though several such protocols exist
(e.g., [25], [26], [27], [28]), we develop a new one here with
an interaction pattern and threat model that is better suited for
our framework. In particular, existing protocols require special
hardware [27] or more rounds of interaction [25], [26], or leak
more information in our threat model [25], [26], [28] than the
one we present. Our protocol is built on principles similar to
a set-intersection cardinality protocol due to Egert et al. [29,
Section 4.4], though we (i) reduce the information it conveys
to only the results of a membership test, versus the cardinality
of a set intersection, and (ii) analyze its privacy properties in
the face of malicious behavior by a requester or responder
(versus only an honest-but-curious participant in their work),
accounting for leakage intrinsic in the application for which
we use it here.
A. Partially Homomorphic Encryption
Our protocol builds upon an IND-CPA-secure [30]
multiplicatively homomorphic encryption scheme E =
〈Gen,Enc,Dec,×[·]〉 with the following algorithms. Below,
z
$
← Z denotes random selection from set Z and assignment
to z, and Y
d
= Y ′ denotes that random variables Y and Y ′
are distributed identically.
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• Gen is a randomized algorithm that on input 1κ outputs
a public-key/private-key pair 〈pk , sk〉 ← Gen(1κ). The
value of pk uniquely determines a plaintext space G
where 〈G,×G〉 denotes a multiplicative, cyclic group of
order r with identity 1G, and where r is a κ-bit prime.
The randomized function $(G) returns a new, random
m
$
← G. Zr = {0, . . . , r− 1} and Z∗r = {1, . . . , r− 1},
as usual.
• Enc is a randomized algorithm that on input public key
pk and plaintext m ∈ G produces a ciphertext c ←
Encpk (m). Let Cpk (m) denote the set of all ciphertexts
that Encpk (m) produces with nonzero probability, and
so Cpk =
⋃
m∈G Cpk (m) is the ciphertext space of the
scheme with public key pk .
• Dec is a deterministic algorithm that on input a private
key sk and ciphertext c ∈ Cpk (m), form ∈ G and pk the
public key corresponding to sk , producesm ← Decsk (c).
If c 6∈ Cpk , then Decsk (c) returns ⊥.
• ×[·] is a randomized algorithm that on input a public key
pk and ciphertexts c1 ∈ Cpk (m1) and c2 ∈ Cpk (m2)
produces a ciphertext c ← c1 ×pk c2 chosen uniformly
at random from Cpk (m1m2). If c1 6∈ Cpk or c2 6∈ Cpk ,
then c1 ×pk c2 returns ⊥. We use
∏
pk and exppk to
denote multiplication of a sequence and exponentiation
using ×pk , respectively, i.e.,
z∏
pk
i=1
ci
d
= c1 ×pk c2 ×pk . . .×pk cz
exppk (c, z)
d
=
z∏
pk
i=1
c
B. Protocol Description
Our protocol is shown in Figure 1, with the actions by
the requester R listed on the left (lines r1–r6), those by the
responder S listed on the right (s1–s4), and messages between
them in the middle (m1–m2). In Figure 1 and below, [z] for
integer z > 0 denotes the set {0, . . . , z − 1}.
At a conceptual level, our private set-membership-test pro-
tocol works as follows. The requester R takes as input an ac-
count identifier a, the user’s chosen password π, a Bloom-filter
length ℓ, and the hash functions 〈hi〉i∈[k] for the Bloom filter
(i.e., each hi : {0, 1}∗ → [ℓ]). R computes its Bloom filter
containing π, specifically a set of indices JR ←
⋃
i∈[k]{hi(π)}
(line r2). The responder S receives as input a set P(a′) of
passwords similar to the password for each local account
a′ ∈ A (i.e., A is its set of local account identifiers), and upon
receiving message m1 computes its own ℓ-sized Bloom filter
containing P(a), i.e., indices JS ←
⋃
π′∈P(a)
⋃
i∈[k]{hi(π
′)}
(line s2).3 The protocol should return true to R if π ∈ P(a),
which for a Bloom filter is indicated by JR ⊆ JS (with some
risk of false positives, as will be discussed in Section V-B2).
3This assumes that all of P(a) will “fit” in an ℓ-sized bloom filter. If not,
S can use any subset of P(a) it chooses of appropriate size. This will be
discussed further in Section V-B2.
R(a, π, ℓ, 〈hi〉i∈[k]) S({P(a
′)}a′∈A)
r1. 〈pk , sk〉 ← Gen(1κ)
r2. JR ←
⋃
i∈[k]
{hi(π)}
r3. ∀j ∈ [ℓ] : cj ←
{
Encpk($(G)) if j ∈ JR
Encpk(1G) if j 6∈ JR
m1.
a, pk , 〈hi〉i∈[k], 〈cj〉j∈[ℓ]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s1. abort if ∃j ∈ [ℓ] : cj 6∈ Cpk
s2. JS ←
⋃
π′∈P(a)
⋃
i∈[k]
{hi(π
′)}
s3. z
$
← Z∗r
s4. ρ ← exppk



 ∏
pk
j∈[ℓ]\JS
cj

, z


m2.
ρ
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
r4. abort if ρ 6∈ Cpk
r5. m ← Decsk (ρ)
r6. return (m
?
= 1G)
Fig. 1: Private set-membership-test protocol, described in
Section IV-B. Requester R returns true if password π is
similar to another password used at responder S for the same
account identifier a, i.e., if π ∈ P(a).
Our protocol equivalently returns a value to R that indicates
whether [ℓ] \ JS ⊆ [ℓ] \ JR, without exposing JS to R or JR
to S. To do so, the requester R encodes JR as ciphertexts
〈cj〉j∈[ℓ] where cj ∈ Cpk (1G) if j ∈ [ℓ]\JR and cj ∈ Cpk (m)
for a randomly chosen m
$
← G if j ∈ JR (r3). In this
way, when S computes ρ in line s4—i.e., by homomorphically
multiplying cj for each j ∈ [ℓ]\JS and then exponentiating by
a random z
$
← Z∗r (s3)—ρ is in Cpk (1G) if [ℓ]\JS ⊆ [ℓ]\JR
and otherwise is almost certainly not in Cpk (1G). As such, R
returns true, indicating that π is similar to the password set
at S for account a, if and only if Decsk (ρ) = 1G (r5–r6).
It is important that both S and R check the validity of
the ciphertexts they receive (lines s1 and r4, respectively).
For S, implicit in this check is that pk is a valid public key
(i.e., capable of being output by Gen). For our implementation
described in Section V-B, these checks are straightforward.
C. Security
We now reason about the security offered by the protocol
of Figure 1 against malicious requesters (Section IV-C1) and
against malicious responders (Section IV-C2). More specifi-
cally, our focus in this section is properties that underlie ac-
count security as informally described in Section III; account
location privacy will be discussed in Section V. All proofs
of propositions in this section are in Appendix A.
1) Security against malicious requester: A malicious re-
quester learns nothing more from executing the protocol in
Figure 1 besides the result m
?
= 1G in line r6 because no
other information is encoded in ρ if the responder follows the
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protocol (i.e., unconditional security). First, if ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G)
then ρ is a ciphertext of any m ∈ G \ {1G} with equal
probability:
Proposition 1. If the responder follows the protocol, then
P
(
ρ ∈ Cpk (m)
∣∣ ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G)) = 1r−1 for any m ∈ G\{1G}.
Second, if ρ ∈ Cpk (m), then it is uniformly distributed in
Cpk (m):
Proposition 2. If the responder follows the protocol, then
P
(
ρ = c
∣∣ ρ ∈ Cpk (m)) = 1|Cpk(m)| for any m ∈ G and any
c ∈ Cpk (m).
2) Security against malicious responder: The system of
which the protocol in Figure 1 is a component will typically
leak the result of the protocol run to the responder. Specifically,
if a run of the protocol is immediately followed by another
run of the protocol, then this is an indication that the protocol
returned true, i.e., that π ∈ P(a). As such, for the purposes
of this section, we will assume that the result of the protocol
is leaked to the responder reliably.
The implications of this leakage to the requirements for
the encryption scheme E are that the requester serves as an
oracle for the responder to learn whether a ciphertext ρ of
its choosing satisfies ρ ∈ Cpk (1G). However, the requester
does so for only a single ciphertext ρ, in that the public
key pk changes every time the protocol is run (line r1). Still,
the responder could potentially use this oracle to determine
which of the ciphertexts 〈cj〉j∈[ℓ] that it receives in line m1
satisfy cj ∈ Cpk (1G) and, in turn, gain information about the
password π that the user is trying to set. Indeed, some leakage
of this form is unavoidable; e.g., the responder could simply
set ρ = c0 and, in doing so, learn whether c0 ∈ Cpk (1G).
Similarly, the responder could set ρ = c0 ×pk c1; if the
protocol returns true, then the responder can conclude with
near certainty that both c0 ∈ Cpk (1G) and c1 ∈ Cpk (1G).
To capture this leakage and the assumptions underlying our
protocol more formally, we define a responder-adversary B
to be a pair B = 〈B1, B2〉 of probabilistic algorithms. B1
takes as input pk and 〈cj〉j∈[ℓ] and outputs a ciphertext ρ and
a state φ.4 B2 is provided the oracle response (i.e., whether
ρ ∈ Cpk (1G)) and the state φ and then outputs a set JB ⊆ [ℓ].
B is said to succeed if JB = JR, where JR is the set of
indices the requester “set” in its Bloom filter by encrypting a
random group element (line r3). More specifically, we define
4We elide the other values in message m1 from the input to B1 only
because they do not contribute the security of the protocol.
experiment ExptSE (〈B1, B2〉) as follows:
Experiment Expt
S
E (〈B1, B2〉) :
〈pk , sk〉 ← Gen(1κ)
JR
$
← {J ⊆ [ℓ] | |J| = k}
∀j ∈ [ℓ] : cj ←
{
Encpk ($(G)) if j ∈ JR
Encpk (1G) if j 6∈ JR
〈ρ, φ〉 ← B1
(
pk , 〈cj〉j∈[ℓ]
)
JB ← B2
(
φ,
(
ρ
?
∈ Cpk (1G)
))
return (JB
?
= JR)
Then, we analyze the security of our protocol against
responder-adversaries B that run in time polynomial in κ by
bounding P
(
Expt
S
E (B) = true
)
.
ElGamal encryption: In order to better analyze the security
of the protocol in Figure 1, we instantiate the encryption
scheme E . We do so with ElGamal encryption [31], which
is implemented as follows.
• Gen(1κ) returns a private key sk = 〈u〉 and public key
pk = 〈g, U〉, where u
$
← Zr, g is a generator of the
(cyclic) group 〈G,×G〉, and U ← gu. We leave it implicit
that the public key pk and private key sk must include
whatever other information is necessary to specifyG, e.g.,
the elliptic curve on which the members of G lie.
• Enc〈g,U〉(m) returns 〈V,W〉 where V ← g
v , v
$
← Zr,
and W ← mUv .
• Dec〈u〉(〈V,W〉) returns WV
−u if {V,W} ⊆ G and
returns ⊥ otherwise.
• 〈V1,W1〉×〈g,U〉〈V2,W2〉 returns 〈V1V2g
y,W1W2U
y〉 for
y
$
← Zr if {V1, V2,W1,W2} ⊆ G and returns ⊥
otherwise.
Generic group model: We prove the security of our protocol
against a responder-adversary B in the generic group model
as presented by Maurer [32]. The generic group model allows
modeling of attacks in which the adversary B cannot exploit
the representation of the group elements used in the crypto-
graphic algorithm. For some problems, such as the discrete
logarithm problem on general elliptic curves, generic attacks
are currently the best known (though better algorithms exist
for curves of particular forms, e.g., [33]). Somewhat like
the random oracle model [34], the generic group model is
idealized, and so even an algorithm proven secure in the
generic group model can be instantiated with a specific group
representation that renders it insecure. Still, and also like the
random oracle model, it has been used to provide assurance for
the security of designs in numerous previous works; e.g., see
Koblitz and Menezes [35] for a discussion of this methodology
and how its results should be interpreted.
A function f : N → R is said to be negligible if for any
positive polynomial φ(κ), there is some κ0 such that f(κ) <
1
φ(κ) for all κ > κ0. We denote such a function by negl(κ).
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Proposition 3. If E is ElGamal encryption, then in the generic
group model,
P
(
Expt
S
E (B) = true
)
≤ 2
(
ℓ
k
)−1
+ negl(κ)
for any responder-adversary B that runs in time polynomial
in κ.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix A. The bound
in Proposition 3 is tight, in the sense that there is a generic
responder-adversary that achieves it (to within a term negligi-
ble in κ). This adversary B = 〈B1, B2〉 performs as follows:
B1 outputs, say, ρ ← c0 and, upon learning ρ
?
∈ Cpk (1G),
B2 guesses JB to be a k-element subset of [ℓ] containing 0
iff ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G).
V. PREVENTING PASSWORD REUSE
In this section, we introduce how to build a password reuse
detection framework based on the private set-membership-test
protocol proposed in Section IV.
A. Design
Our password reuse detection framework enables a requester
R to inquire with multiple responders as to whether the
password π chosen by a user for the account at R with
identifier a is similar to another password already set for a
at some responder. The requester does so with the help of a
directory, which is a (possibly replicated) server that provides
a front-end to requesters for this purpose. The directory stores,
per identifier a, a list of addresses (possibly pseudonymous
addresses, as we will discuss below) of websites at which a
has been used to set up an account. We stress that the directory
does not handle or observe passwords in our framework.
The requesters and responders need not trust each other
in our framework, and employ the protocol described in
Section IV to interact via the directory. More specifically,
a user of the requester R selects a password π for her
account with identifier a, and submits π to R. R sends the
message in line m1 of Figure 1 to the directory, which it
forwards to some subset of m responders, out of the Ma total
registered as having accounts associated with a at the directory.
(How it selects m is discussed in Section VI.) The response
from responder Si is denoted m2i in Figure 2. Once the
directory collects these responses, it permutes them randomly
and forwards them back to R, to prevent the R from knowing
which responder returned which result. R then processes each
as in lines r4–r6; any of these results that are true indicates
that some responder that was queried has a password similar to
π set for account a. If any are true, then requester (presumably)
rejects π and asks the user to select a different password
(perhaps with guidance to help her choose one that is likely
to not be used elsewhere).
There are some additional operations needed to support the
framework, as well.
• Directory entry addition: After a new account is success-
fully set up, the requester sends its address (discussed
b b b
m1
m1
m1
m1
m21
m22
m2m
b
b
b
b
b
b
{m2i}mi=1
password
R
Directory
S1
Perm
accept
or
reject
User
S2
Requester Responders
Sm
Fig. 2: Password reuse detection framework based on the
private set-membership-test protocol introduced in Section IV.
below) to the directory to be stored with the account
identifier a.
• Directory entry deletion: When an account a on a web
server (responder) is no longer used, the responder should
update the directory to remove the responder address
associated with a.
• Password change: When a user tries to change the
password of an account, the web server should launch
the protocol (as a requester) before the new password is
accepted to replace the old.
The requester can communicate with the directory normally
(e.g., using TCP/IP and TLS layered above), trusting the
directory to mask its identity from each responder (in which
case, the directory behaves as an anonymizing proxy, cf., [36],
[37]). Or, if the requester does not trust the directory to hide
its identity, then it can communicate with the directory using
an anonymizing protocol such as Tor (https://www.torproject.
org/, [38]). Similarly, each responder address registered at the
directory can be a regular TCP/IP endpoint, if it trusts the
directory to hide its identity from others, or an anonymous
server address such as a Tor hidden-service address [38] if
it does not. In the latter case, the responder should register a
distinct anonymous server address at the directory per account
identifier a, to prevent identifying the responder by the number
of accounts it hosts.
While each website could choose individually whether to
trust the directory to hide its identity from others, we will
evaluate the performance of our system only when either all
websites trust the directory in this sense or none do. We refer
to these models in the rest of the paper as the trusted-directory
model and the untrusted-directory model, respectively. We
believe that the trusted-directory model would be especially
well-suited for deployment by a large cloud operator to serve
its tenants, since these tenants already must trust the cloud
operator.
1) Security for each responder: Our framework is agnostic
to the method by which each responder generates the set
P(a) for an account a. We envision that it would do so
by leveraging existing passwords guessers (e.g., [5], [39],
[40], [41]), seeded with the actual password for the account.
Moreover, the responder need not retain the similar passwords
explicitly, but instead should store in P(a) only the hash of
each similar password, using a time-consuming cryptographic
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hash function H , making P(a) more costly to exploit if the
site is breached [42]. In particular, this hash function need
not be the same as that used to hash the real password
during normal login, and so can be considerably more time-
consuming. Going further, the responder could proactively
generate the set JS when the password for a is set at S,
and dispense of P(a) altogether. However, if the Bloom filter
size ℓ selected by the requester is not fixed and known to the
responder in advance (see Section V-C), then the responder
would need to store multiple sets JS reflecting differently sized
P(a) sets.
Protecting JS from disclosure: As shown in Section IV-C1,
the only information leaked to the requester is the result of
the protocol in Figure 1, i.e., ρ
?
∈ Cpk (1G), regardless of the
behavior of the requester (Propositions 1–2). Still, however,
this information can erode the security of JS for account a
over multiple queries. For example, if a malicious requester
sets cj ← Encpk (m) where m 6= 1G for one Bloom-filter
index j and cj′ ← Encpk (1G) for j′ 6= j, then the result of
m
?
= 1G reveals whether j ∈ JS . After ℓ such queries, the
requester can learn the entirety of JS and then search for the
items stored in the Bloom filter offline.
The risk of such an attack can be largely mitigated by
involving the user. For example, if a is an email address or
can be associated with one at the directory, then the directory
can email the user upon being contacted by a requester, to
confirm that she is trying to (re)set her password at some
website. This email could be presented to the user much like
an account setup confirmation email today, containing a URL
at the directory on which the user could click to confirm her
attempt to (re)set her password. The directory would simply
hold message m1 or each message m2i until receiving this
confirmation, discarding the message if it times out await-
ing the user confirmation. (Presumably the requester website
would alert the user to check her inbox for this confirmation
email.) To avoid requiring the user to click confirmation URLs
over the course of multiple attempts to select a password
and so multiple runs of the protocol in Figure 1 (which
should occur only if the user is still not using a password
manager), the directory could allow one such confirmation
to permit protocol runs for a short window of time (e.g.,
one minute), at a risk of allowing a few extra queries from
a malicious requester. However, except during this window,
attempts by malicious requesters to query responders will be
dropped by the directory. For a requester at which a user a
has no account, such queries to responders will be dropped
except when concurrent with password (re)set attempts for a
at another requester, which presumably would be difficult to
anticipate.
Limiting utility of a JS disclosure: The risk that the adversary
finds the password, even with JS , is small if the user is already
using a password manager, since state-of-the-art password
managers can generate and auto-fill passwords that resist
even an offline attack. Even if the user is not already using
a password manager, obtaining the account password using
this attack should again be difficult if the cryptographic hash
function H is costly to compute. Moreover, the attacker can
utilize a guessed account password only if it can determine
the responder S at which it is set for account a, which it is
prevented from doing by account location privacy.
Still, to counter this risk for those not yet using a password
manager and just in case the attacker finds S, we advocate
that S form its set P(a) to include honey passwords [43], [44],
[45]. That is, when the password is set (or reset) at a website
for account a, a collection of d honey passwords should be
chosen, as well, via a state-of-the-art method of doing so.
Similar passwords should then be generated for each of the
d+1 passwords (the real password and the honey passwords)
using an identical algorithm, and the similar passwords for
each should together be used to constitute P(a). In this way,
even if the attacker learns the entire contents of JS for a
responder S, the set JS will contain at least d+ 1 passwords
that appear to be roughly equally likely. If any of the honey
passwords are then used in an attempt to log into the account,
the website can lock the account and force the user to reset
her password after successfully authenticating via a fallback
method. The primary cost of using honey passwords is a linear-
in-d growth in the size of P(a), which linearly reduces the
number of passwords similar to the real password that can be
accommodated by the Bloom-filter size ℓ (which is determined
by the requester). We will show in Section VI, however, that
this cost has little impact on preventing password reuse.
2) Security for the requester: Security for the requester in
our framework is more straightforward, given Proposition 3
that proves the privacy of JR against a malicious responder
(and from the directory) in the generic group model. Moreover,
the requester’s identity is hidden from responders either by
the directory (in the trusted-directory model) or because the
requester contacts the directory anonymously (in the untrusted-
directory model).
As discussed in Section IV-C2 and accounted for in
Proposition 3, each responder (and the directory) learns the
outcome of the protocol (i.e., ρ
?
∈ Cpk (1G)), since it sees
whether the requester runs the protocol again. That is, a
true result will presumably cause the requester to reject the
password and ask the user for another, with which it repeats
the protocol. Because the password is changed each time, the
information gained by each responder does not accumulate
over these multiple runs.
Still, if the false result returned for the password π finally
accepted at the requester is of concern, it is possible to hide
even this information, at some extra expense. To do so, the
requester follows the acceptance of π with a “decoy” run of
the protocol if necessary to ensure that two runs of the protocol
are conducted (i.e., only if π was the first password offered
by the user), and then with another decoy run with probability
1
2 . The requester ignores the result of each decoy run, and the
user need not be delayed while it is conducted. The decoy(s)
hide whether the second-to-last run of the protocol pertains to
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the password π that the requester finally accepted.5 That said,
because these decoy runs add overhead and, again, because
the responder is limited to learn information about π in only
a single protocol run (and to learn a limited amount, per
Proposition 3), we do not consider decoys further here.
B. Implementation
We built a prototype implementation of our framework to
evaluate its performance and scalability, and to inform its pa-
rameterization (see Section VI). We realized the cryptographic
part of our protocol in C and other parts using the Go language.
1) Cryptography: Our implementation uses the ElGamal
cryptosystem in an elliptic-curve group (EC-ElGamal) as the
underlying multiplicatively homomorphic scheme E leveraged
in Figure 1, owing to its shorter keys and ciphertexts for
comparable security in comparison to ElGamal over other
groups [46]. We realized all cryptographic operations using
MIRACL (https://github.com/miracl/MIRACL), an efficient C
software library for elliptic-curve cryptography.
Our implementation includes four standardized elliptic
curves: secp160r1, secp192r1 (NIST P-192), secp224r1 (NIST
P-224) and secp256r1 (NIST P-256) [47], [48]. Elliptic-curve
cryptosystems based on these curves can provide security
roughly equivalent to RSA with key lengths of 1024, 1536,
2048 and 3072 bits, respectively. The generator g used with
each curve has a cofactor of 1 [47], so that the group includes
all curve points. This allows the requester and responders
to check the validity of ciphertexts (i.e., lines s1 and r4 in
Figure 1) by checking if each ciphertext component is a valid
point on the elliptic curve (or the point at infinity).
To make messages shorter and save bandwidth, we enable
point compression in our implementation. Point compression
(e.g., [49, Section A.9.6]) is a technique that compresses each
elliptic-curve point to half its original size by using only
y mod 2 in place of its y coordinate value. Correspondingly,
point decompression reconstructs the point by recovering the
y coordinate based on the x coordinate and y mod 2.
2) Bloom filters: A Bloom filter has a false positive rate
of ≈ (1 − e−k·
n
ℓ )k where n = |P(a)| denotes the number
elements to be inserted into the Bloom filter by the responder,
ℓ denotes the length of the Bloom filter and k denotes the
number of hash functions (e.g., see [50, pp. 109-110]). As
such, the number of hash functions that minimizes false
positives is
kopt =
ℓ
n
· ln 2
and in this case, the minimized false positive rate is
(
1
2
)kopt
=
(
1
2
) ℓ
n
·ln 2
≈ (0.6185)
ℓ
n (1)
In our framework, k and ℓ are decided by the requester,
while n is determined by each responder with the knowledge
of k and ℓ received from the requester. In our implementation,
5This decoy run could also be constructed to detect denial-of-service attacks
by a responder, as will be discussed in Section VII.
the requester chooses k = 20 by default, and so each responder
then generates a set P(a) of size n ≤ ℓ
k
· ln 2 to ensure a false
positive rate of ≈ 2−20.
3) Precomputation: We use precomputation to optimize the
creation of ciphertexts cj by the requester in our protocol.
Specifically, the requester precomputes private key u, public
key U , and values {Vj}j∈[ℓ] and {Wj}j∈[ℓ], where each
〈U, Vj ,Wj〉 is a valid Diffie-Hellman triple, i.e., 〈Vj ,Wj〉 ∈
C〈g,U〉(1G). To create a ciphertext cj of a different group
element m 6= 1G, the requester need only multiply Wj by
m; thus, line r3 is completed in at most one multiplication
per j ∈ [ℓ]. In practice, this precomputation could begin once
the user enters the account registration web page and continue
during idle periods until a password is successfully set.
C. Response Time
In this section, we evaluate the response time of our proto-
type system as seen by the requester (and in the absence of any
user interaction, such as that described in Section V-A1), with
two goals in mind. First, we want to systematically measure
the effects of various parameter settings on our prototype
implementation, to inform the selection of these parameters
through an optimization process discussed in Section VI. We
mainly explore two different parameters of our framework:
The maximum number of similar passwords n = |P(a)| per
responder (as determined by setting the Bloom filter size
ℓ = ⌈ 20nln 2 ⌉ in the protocol), and the number m of responders.
In Appendix B, we also explore the impact of EC-ElGamal
key length on the protocol response time and bandwidth. The
second main goal of our experiments here is to compare the
performance of our prototype with and without leveraging
Tor for implementing account location privacy, i.e., the
untrusted-directory and trusted-directory models, respectively.
In doing so, we hope to shed light on the performance costs of
adopting a more pessimistic trust model in which the directory
is not trusted to protect the websites where each account
identifier a has been used to register an account.
1) Experimental setup: In our evaluations, we set up one
requester, one directory, and up to 128 responders, spread
across six machines located in our department. The six
machines were on the same 1Gb/s network. The requester
and the directory ran on separate machines with the same
specification: 2.67GHz × 8 physical cores, 72GiB RAM,
Ubuntu 14.04 x86 64. The (up to) 128 responders were split
evenly across four other, identical machines: 2.3GHz × 32
physical cores with hyper-threading enabled (and so 64 logical
cores), 128GiB RAM, Ubuntu 16.04 x86 64. Each of the
responders sharing one machine was limited to using two
logical cores, and had its own exclusive data files, processes,
and network sockets.
Parameters were set to the following defaults unless other-
wise specified: n = 1000, m = 64, and elliptic-curve key
length of 192 bits. In particular, m = 64 is conservative
based on recent studies. For example, a 2017 study with 154
participants found that users have a mean of 26.3 password-
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protected web accounts [7], which is quite consistent with
other studies (e.g., [51], [52]).
Because the public Tor network is badly under-provisioned
for its level of use and so its performance varies significantly
over time, in our tests for the untrusted-directory model, we
utilized a private Tor network with nodes distributed across
North America and Europe. Our private Tor network (see
Figure 3) consisted of three Tor authorities, eight normal onion
routers, and two special onion routers. The eight normal
onion routers were running on eight different Amazon EC2
(m4.large) instances, one located in each of the eight Amazon
AWS regions in North America and Europe. Among these
onion routers, three were also running as Tor authorities,
with one in Europe, one in U.S. West, and the other in
U.S. East. Two special onion routers were running on the
machine in our department hosting the directory; one (“Exit”
in Figure 3) exclusively served as the exit node of Tor circuits
from requesters, and the other (“RP” in Figure 3) served
exclusively as the “rendezvous point” picked by the directory
to communicate with Tor hidden services, i.e., the responders.
As shown in Figure 3, each circuit additionally included two
more onion routers (“OR” in Figure 3) chosen at random from
among the eight normal onion routers already described.
Requester Directory
server
Responder
OR OR OR ORExit RP
Fig. 3: Topology of our untrusted-directory experimental setup.
Described in Section V-C1.
All datapoints reported in the graphs below are averaged
from 50 executions. Relative standard deviations, denoted χ,
are reported in figure captions.
2) Results: A measure of primary concern for our frame-
work is the response time witnessed by the requester, since this
delay will be imposed on the user experience while setting her
password. Figure 4a shows the response time in the trusted-
directory model, where the requester connects directly to the
directory and the directory connects directly with each re-
sponder. In contrast, Figure 4b shows the response time in the
untrusted-directory model, and so connections are performed
through Tor. Precomputation costs (see Section V-B3) are not
included in Figure 4, as these costs are expected to be borne
off the critical path of interacting with the user. Tor circuit
setup times are amortized over the 50 runs contributing to each
datapoint in Figure 4b. In practice, we expect this setup cost
to be similarly amortized over attempts needed by the user
to choose an acceptable (not reused) password, or relegated
to a precomputation stage when the user first accesses the
requester’s account creation/password reset page.
One observation from Figure 4 is that the response-time
cost of mistrusting the directory and so of relying on Tor to
implement account location privacy, is typically≥ 2× for the
parameters evaluated there. Recall that in Figure 4b, both the
requester–directory and directory–responder communications
were routed through two onion routers chosen randomly
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Fig. 4: Response time for various n and m
from Amazon datacenter locations in North America and
Europe (see Figure 3), in contrast to LAN communication in
Figure 4a. The costs of these long-haul hops and Tor-specific
processing increased as n grew, due to the corresponding
growth in query message size (see Appendix B).
Another effect illustrated in Figure 4 is the impact of
additional responders (i.e., growth of m) on the response time
witnessed by the requester. The main underlying cause of this
effect is the variance in the speeds with which the responders
return responses to the directory. This variance is small when
communication is direct, but it grows substantially when Tor is
used, due primarily to the differences in routes taken between
the directory and each responder.
These effects are also illustrated in Figure 5, which shows
the response time observed by the requester when the directory
returned the proportion of m = 64 responses on the vertical
axis as soon as that proportion was available to it. So, for
example, Figure 5b shows that when n = 210, if the directory
waited for 75% of the responses (i.e., 48 responses) before
returning them to the requester, the requester observed an
average response time of 9.55s (since (9.55, 0.75) is a point
on the n = 210 curve).
When Tor is being used, the delays before the directory
receives responses, and their variance, could presumably be
reduced with improvements to Tor that leverage the multi-
cast nature of the communication pattern in our framework.
Specifically, the directory forwards the same message m1 to
all responders. An anonymous communication system that
exploits this one-to-many multicast pattern to gain efficiencies
while still hiding the multicast recipients (e.g., [53]) could
presumably reduce these delays and their variance.
VI. PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION
At first glance, the results of Section V-C are perhaps
discouraging, since they suggest that the response time of
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testing with a large number n of similar passwords and at
a large number m of queried responders is potentially large,
especially if the directory is untrusted (Figure 4b). In this
section we describe an approach to select optimal parameters
for use in our framework, specifically parameter values m and
n that maximize the likelihood of detecting the use of a similar
password, subject to a response-time goal. As we will see, the
results are not discouraging at all—a high true detection rate
can be achieved within reasonable response-time limits with
a surprisingly small n and while querying a modest number
m of responders from among the total number of responders
Ma registered at the directory for account a.
The reason behind this initially surprising result is the
typical manner in which people create new passwords by
applying simple, predictable transforms to existing passwords.
Numerous studies (e.g., [41], [39]) have found very low
variation in the patterns that users leverage to modify their
passwords (when they modify their passwords at all). Provided
that responder Si populates Pi(a) based on current knowledge
about these transforms, the probability that the user’s candidate
password π is contained within Pi(a) at a randomly chosen
responder Si is approximately as shown in Figure 6 (cf., [39,
Fig. 5]), as a function of the n
d+1 passwords in Pi(a) that are
similar to the actual password set for account a (i.e., ignoring
those similar to the d honey passwords; see Section V-A1).6
As we can see, this probability is already substantial for very
small n
d+1 . For example, this probability is ≈ 0.34 for even
n
d+1 = 1; in other words, users on average employ the same
password at ≈ 34% of the websites where they have accounts.
Moreover, this probability grows quickly as n
d+1 is increased
6Figure 6 is a log-normal CDF computed to fit points selected from [39,
Fig. 5] by manual inspection, as we were unsuccessful in obtaining the source
data for that figure.
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Fig. 6: An estimate of P (π ∈ Pi(a)) as a function of
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where n = |Pi(a)|, d is the number of honey passwords (see
Section V-A1), and the probability is taken with respect to
random selection of the user and responder Si; based on [39,
Fig. 5]
only slightly.
The key insight here is that if a user’s candidate password
π is chosen in the way that users typically do, then using a
large n provides little additional power (Figure 6) but imposes
substantially greater cost (Figure 4) than using a small n to
detect that π is similar to another one already chosen. More-
over, if we model the true detection rate when querying m
randomly chosen responders7 as tdr = 1 − (P (π 6∈ Pi(a)))m
(ignoring the probability of false detections due to the use of
a Bloom filter), increasing m provides more detection power,
in contrast. To more precisely balance these parameters and
the response time of the protocol, we model the response time
using
t(m,n) = β0 + β1 · n+ β2 ·m+ β3 · n ·m
Regression analysis using the data in Section V-C yields
β0 = 1.5507, β1 = 5.8834× 10−3, β2 = 2.6209× 10−3 and
β3 = 4.7135×10−5 in the untrusted-directory case (RMSE =
0.4547) and β0 = 6.4595 × 10−3, β1 = 2.2885 × 10−3,
β2 = 1.0271× 10−3 and β3 = 2.0336× 10−5 in the trusted-
directory case (RMSE = 0.1276). Then, the requester chooses
m and n using the following optimization:
maximize
m,n
tdr = 1− (P (π 6∈ Pi(a)))
m
subject to t(m,n) ≤ tgoal
1 ≤ n
1 ≤ m ≤Ma
where tgoal is the response time requested by the requester
andMa is the number of responders registered at the directory
as having an account for identifier a. The directory can send
7The directory should retain its same random choice ofm responders across
the user’s failed attempts to select a password that she has not reused, lest
she simply retry the same or a closely related password until a set of m
responders at which it is not used is chosen. Alternatively, the requester can
be charged with ensuring that the user’s attempted passwords are sufficiently
different from one another.
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tgoal (s)
.01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10
d = 0 n 1 1 2 2 5 9 13 16 20 23
m 1 10 17 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
tdr .343 .985 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1
d = 4 n - 5 5 5 5 10 10 15 20 20
m - 1 10 19 26 24 26 26 26 26
tdr - .343 .985 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1
d = 9 n - - - 10 10 10 10 10 20 20
m - - - 8 16 24 26 26 26 26
tdr - - - .965 .999 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1
(a) Trusted directory
tgoal (s)
1.60 1.62 1.64 1.66 1.68 1.70 1.72 1.74 1.76 1.78
d = 0 n 1 2 2 5 8 11 14 17 19 22
m 16 21 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
tdr .999 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1
d = 4 n 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 15 15 20
m 6 13 20 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
tdr .920 .996 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1
d = 9 n - 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 20 20
m - 3 9 16 22 26 26 26 25 26
tdr - .716 .977 .999 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1 ≈1
(b) Untrusted directory
TABLE II: Choices for m and n computed using optimization
in Section VI with Ma = 26
Ma to the requester in an initial negotiation round before
message m1.
This optimization, together with using the curve in Figure 6
to estimate P (π ∈ Pi(a)) and the regression results above to
estimate t(m,n), yields results like those shown in Table II.
In these optimizations, we set Ma = 26, because recent work
found the mean number of password-protected online accounts
per user is 26 [7]. The response-time goals tgoal used in
Table II were chosen simply to show how the optimal m and
n vary under stringent response-time constraints. As shown
there, for many response-time goals tgoal, a true detection rate
tdr ≈ 1 can be achieved with very small values of n
d+1 , often
as little as 1 or 2.
In light of this finding, it is clear that the full range of
parameter settings explored in Section V-C will very rarely
be needed in practice. This is fortunate, since small values of
n greatly improve the throughput of requester-responder inter-
actions, especially in the trusted-directory model. To see this,
Table III shows the throughput of our implementation, mea-
sured as the largest number of qualifying responses achieved
as the requests per second were increased, as a function of n
and m. In Table IIIa, a response was qualifying if its response
time was ≤ 5s.
In contrast, in Table IIIb a response was qualifying if its
response time was ≤ 8s. This 3s difference between the
standards for qualifying in the two tests was needed because
we constructed the untrusted-directory test to capture as faith-
fully as possible the Tor costs that a real deployment would
incur. Notably, even though the m responders queried per
request were chosen from only 64 responders in total (the
m
n 1 6 11 16 21 26
1 4304 1013 492 325 237 174
10 2415 549 277 188 155 122
20 1478 336 182 129 98 78
30 1076 243 124 86 63 53
40 788 187 94 67 49 40
50 683 159 76 52 39 33
60 611 132 63 43 32 25
(a) Trusted directory
m
n 1 6 11 16 21 26
1 95 61 42 33 27 22
10 87 59 40 31 25 20
20 78 54 37 28 23 19
30 71 51 35 27 20 16
40 62 44 32 24 18 14
50 53 39 26 20 15 11
60 42 31 20 16 10 10
(b) Untrusted directory
TABLE III: Maximum qualifying responses per second
configuration was the same as in Section V-C), no two requests
were allowed to use the same Tor circuit, since they would be
unable to do so in a real deployment, where different addresses
for the same responder are stored for different user accounts
at the directory. (The exception is if the requests were for
the same user and at the same responder.) So, each request
necessitated construction of new Tor circuits to its responders,
which increased response times commensurately.
To put Table III in context, a throughput of 50 qualifying
responses per second is enough to enable each of the 287
million Internet users in the U.S.8 to setup or change pass-
words on more than 5 accounts per year. Moreover, we believe
the numbers in Table III to be pessimistic, in that in each
request, the m responders were chosen from only Ma = 64
responders in total, versus from likely many more in practice.
Still, based on Table IIIb, a deployment using the untrusted-
directory model would presumably require adaptations of Tor
for our use-case (e.g., [53]) and distribution of the directory.
We note, however, that even a non-replicated directory
should easily handle the storage requirements of our design.
With 3.58 billion active Internet users worldwide and an av-
erage of 26 password-protected accounts per user, the storage
of a Tor hidden service address for each user account at each
website amounts to only ≈ 1.5TB of state. In the trusted-
directory model, the storage requirements would be even less.
VII. DENIALS OF SERVICE
Our design introduces denial-of-service opportunities for
misbehaving requesters, responders, or the directory. We dis-
cuss these risks here, as well as methods to remedy them.
Perhaps the most troubling is a responder who returns
ρ ∈ Cpk (1G) regardless of the request ciphertexts 〈cj〉j∈[ℓ] in
message m1, thereby giving the requester reason to reject the
user’s chosen password even when the user’s chosen password
is not similar to others she set elsewhere. This denial-of-
service attack would primarily serve to frustrate users, but
fortunately a responder that misbehaves in this way can be
caught by simple audit mechanisms. For example, at any point,
the directory could generate a message m1 in which each
cj ∈ Cpk \Cpk (1G) and for which it knows the private key sk
corresponding to pk ; if a responder responds to this query with
ρ ∈ Cpk (1G), then the directory has proof that the responder
is lying and, e.g., can simply remove the responder from future
8This estimate was retrieved from https://www.statista.com/topics/2237/
internet-usage-in-the-united-states/ on April 15, 2018.
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queries. In principle, a requester could also generate such
audit queries, though doing so would require the directory
to suspend the user-consent mechanism in Section V-A1. In
this case, a detection would enable the requester to learn that
either one of the responders is misbehaving (but it would need
help from the directory to figure out which one) or that the
directory is misbehaving (in which case it would need to report
it to some managing authority).
Other misbehaviors can render our framework silently in-
effective while they are allowed to persist. For example, a
malicious directory could simply not query responders at
all, instead forging their responses to indicate no password
reuse (i.e., each ρi ∈ Cpk \ Cpk (1G)). Again, a simple audit
(knowingly attempting to reuse a password at a requester)
can detect such misbehavior. Presuming such misbehaviors
will occur rarely and be remedied quickly, we believe our
framework will suffice to discourage password reuse even if
it usually works.
As our framework enables the requester to perform pre-
computation to reduce its costs on the critical path of protocol
execution, the critical-path computation cost of the protocol
is greater for the responder than it is for the requester
(see Appendix B). This is even more true for misbehaving
requesters that replay the same request, in an effort to merely
occupy directory and responder resources. Of course, this con-
cern is not unique to our framework, and various techniques
to stem such denials of service exist that would be amenable
to adoption in our framework (e.g., [54], [55]). In addition,
steps detailed in Section V-A1 to require user consent (through
clicking on a confirmation URL) to complete the protocol
could interfere with such attacks. In the worst case, however,
responders and the directory can refuse requests until the
flood subsides, albeit temporarily reducing the utility of our
framework to the status quo today.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Adams and Sasse famously declared, “Users are not the
enemy” [23]. While we do not mean to suggest otherwise, it
has also long been understood in a variety of contexts that
users must be compelled to adhere to security policies, as
otherwise they will not do so. Despite decades of haranguing
users to stop reusing passwords, their adoption of methods to
manage passwords more effectively has been painfully slow.
In combination with advances in credential-stuffing attacks
that leverage breached password databases, this problem has
become so severe as to prompt some organizations to take
dramatic and arguably counterproductive actions such as buy-
ing black-market passwords (e.g., [1]), thereby rewarding the
breach.
We believe it is now time to consider the possibility of
imposing technical measures to prevent the use of similar
passwords across websites. In this paper we have presented
one possible method for doing so, by coordinating password
selection across websites so that similar passwords cannot
be used for the same account identifier. An ingredient in
this framework is a set-membership-test protocol, which we
designed to fit well with our framework and that we proved
satisfies desired security properties. Our framework builds
from this protocol to address the leakage necessitated by our
goals, and specifically to implement two desirable properties:
account security and account location privacy. Finally, we
leveraged tendencies of how users reuse passwords to optimize
the parameters for our framework, enabling it to be effective
with surprisingly modest costs.
Our intention with this paper is to initiate a debate around
whether technical means to interfere with password reuse are
appropriate and whether an acceptable technical approach is
possible, toward the end of changing password-reuse culture.
We look forward to contributing to the debate.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1 . Note that ρ ∈ Cpk because each cj ∈
Cpk , by line s1. If
 ∏
pk
j∈[ℓ]\JS
cj

 ∈ Cpk (m′)
in line s4, then ρ ∈ Cpk ((m′)z) for z chosen in line s3. So, if
ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G) or, in other words, (m′)z 6= 1G, then z such that
(m′)z = m for a specific m ∈ G \ {1G} is chosen in line s3
with probability 1
r−1 .
Proof of Proposition 2 . This follows immediately since for
c1 ∈ Cpk (m1) and c2 ∈ Cpk (m2), the value c ← c1×pk c2 is
chosen uniformly at random from Cpk (m1m2).
For the proof of Proposition 3, we leverage the generic
group model as presented by Maurer [32], which Jager and
Schwenk [56] have shown to be equivalent to the other
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common generic model, due to Shoup [57]. In the Maurer
model, B (i.e., B1 in experiment Expt
S
E ) is provided only
the group order r and black-box access (i.e., oracle access)
to the group elements g, U , {Vj}j∈[ℓ], {Wj}j∈[ℓ], where each
cj = 〈Vj ,Wj〉, rather than receiving these group elements as
inputs. Because the group representation is never exposed to
B, each group element is equivalently represented as its base-g
discrete logarithm. So, the oracle holds integers 1, u, {vj}j∈[ℓ],
{wj}j∈[ℓ] to represent g, U , {Vj}j∈[ℓ], {Wj}j∈[ℓ], respectively,
where U = gu, each Vj = g
vj , and eachWj = g
wj . The oracle
stores each of these values in an array at an index known
to the adversary. Moreover, the oracle supports creation of
new values via computation queries reflecting the application
of the group operation ×G to two existing group elements
represented at indices specified in the query; the values so
created are appended to the array but not returned. Specifically,
in each computation query, B specifies two indices, and the
oracle applies the ×G operator to the group elements g
x, gx
′
represented by the values x and x′ at those indices, resulting
in x+ x′ being stored in the array to represent gx+x
′
.
In addition to computation queries, B can also perform
equality queries, where it asks whether the group elements
represented by two indices it specifies are the same. Finally, in
accordance with our protocol, the adversary is permitted to ask
just one DDH query, i.e., whether uv
?
≡r w for u the second
value in the array (representing U ) and v and w at specified
indices in the array representing gv and gw , respectively. This
corresponds to providing B2 with the answer to ρ
?
∈ Cpk (1G),
where pk = 〈g, U〉 and ρ = 〈gv , gw〉.
Proof of Proposition 3 . Through the computation operations
available to B, every value stored in the oracle is of the form
αu+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
βjvj +
∑
j∈[ℓ]
γjwj + δ (2)
for constants α, {βj}j∈[ℓ], {γj}j∈[ℓ], δ ∈ Zr known to B.
Each equality query tests whether gz
?
= gz
′
or, in other
words, whether z
?
≡r z′, for values z and z′ at the specified
indices. These values are of the form in (2), i.e.,
z ≡r αu+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
βjvj +
∑
j∈[ℓ]
γjwj + δ
z′ ≡r α
′u+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
β′jvj +
∑
j∈[ℓ]
γ′jwj + δ
′
and so the test z
?
≡r z
′ is equivalent to
(α− α′) + ∑
j∈[ℓ]\JR
(γj − γ
′
j)vj

u
+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
(βj − β
′
j)vj +
∑
j∈JR
(γj − γ
′
j)wj + (δ − δ
′)
?
≡r 0 (3)
where u, {vj}j∈[ℓ], and {wj}j∈JR are chosen independently
at random from Zr. As such, ignoring queries that return true
with probability 1 (and so teach the adversary nothing), the
probability that each oracle query returns true is 1/r. So,
letting E denote the event that at least one equality query
returns true, if B makes q equality queries, then
P (E) ≤
q
r
(4)
B2 is eventually provided the answer to whether ρ
?
∈
Cpk (1G) for a ρ of its choosing. In this case ρ is represented
by a pair 〈v, w〉 where v and w are of the form in (2), i.e.,
v ≡r αu+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
βjvj +
∑
j∈[ℓ]
γjwj + δ
w ≡r α
′u+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
β′jvj +
∑
j∈[ℓ]
γ′jwj + δ
′
and the test ρ
?
∈ Cpk (1G) is equivalent to uv
?
≡r w or, in
other words,
αu2 + (δ − α′)u+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
(βju− β
′
j)vj
+
∑
j∈[ℓ]
(γju− γ
′
j)wj − δ
′ ?≡r 0 (5)
Let J = {j ∈ [ℓ] | γju− γ′j 6≡r 0}. The number of possible
sets JR such that J ∩ JR = ∅ is
(
ℓ−|J|
k
)
, and so
P
(
J ∩ JR = ∅
∣∣ ¬E) =
(
ℓ−|J|
k
)
(
ℓ
k
) (6)
Since the answer to ρ
?
∈ Cpk (1G) is not computed using wj
for any j ∈ [ℓ]\J, B2 must choose which of these indices are
in JR blindly. So, if J ∩ JR = ∅, then
P
(
JB = JR
∣∣ J ∩ JR = ∅ ∧ ¬E) ≤ 1(ℓ−|J|
k
) (7)
On the other hand, now suppose J∩JR 6= ∅, and recall that wj
for each j ∈ J∩JR is distributed uniformly and independently
in Zr. In the event ¬E, at least r − q values remain equally
possible from the adversary’s point of view for each wj , j ∈
J ∩ JR, and so ρ ∈ Cpk (1G) with probability
P
(
ρ ∈ Cpk (1G)
∣∣ J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∧ ¬E) ≤ 1
r − q
(8)
Moreover, if ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G), B2 can succeed with choosing JR
with probability
P
(
JB = JR
∣∣∣ ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G) ∧
J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∧ ¬E
)
≤
1(
ℓ
k
)
−
(
ℓ−|J|
k
) (9)
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So,
P
(
Expt
S
E (B) = true
)
= P (JB = JR)
≤ P
(
JB = JR
∣∣ ¬E)+ P (E)
≤ P
(
JB = JR
∣∣ J ∩ JR = ∅ ∧ ¬E)P(J ∩ JR = ∅ ∣∣ ¬E)
+ P
(
JB = JR
∣∣ J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∧ ¬E)P(J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∣∣ ¬E)
+ P (E)
≤ P
(
JB = JR
∣∣ J ∩ JR = ∅ ∧ ¬E)P(J ∩ JR = ∅ ∣∣ ¬E)
+



 P
(
JB = JR
∣∣∣ ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G) ∧
J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∧ ¬E
)
+ P
(
ρ ∈ Cpk (1G)
∣∣ J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∧ ¬E)


· P
(
J ∩ JR 6= ∅
∣∣ ¬E)


+ P (E)
≤ P
(
JB = JR
∣∣ J ∩ JR = ∅ ∧ ¬E)P(J ∩ JR = ∅ ∣∣ ¬E)
+ P
(
JB = JR
∣∣∣ ρ 6∈ Cpk (1G) ∧
J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∧ ¬E
)
P
(
J ∩ JR 6= ∅
∣∣ ¬E)
+ P
(
ρ ∈ Cpk (1G)
∣∣ J ∩ JR 6= ∅ ∧ ¬E)+ P (E)
Filling in the values from (4) and (6)–(9) gives the result.
APPENDIX B
RESOURCE UTILIZATION MICROBENCHMARKS
In this appendix we evaluate the resource utilization im-
posed by our protocol in Figure 1. Figure 7a shows the
computational burden for computing the query (line m1) and
response (line m2) messages in the protocol of Figure 1.
(In comparison, the computational cost on the requester to
process the response is minimal and so is omitted here.) Recall
from Section V-B3 that our protocol implementation leverages
precomputation; precomputation costs are not included in
Figure 7a. Tor was not used in these tests. Figure 7b shows
the size of the query message (message m1), which is the
cost that dominates the bandwidth use of the protocol, since
the response (message m2) is only a single ciphertext.
We caution the reader in interpreting these figures that
the resource costs for large values of n are included for
completeness and to inform the optimization in Section VI.
For reasons we discuss in Section VI, such large values of n
will generally not be necessary in our protocol.
One peculiarity evident in Figure 7a is that the responder’s
computational cost is better when using the 256-bit elliptic
curve than using the 224-bit one. This anomaly is caused
by the point compression technique (see Section V-B1): to
recover the points’ y coordinates from received EC-ElGamal
ciphertexts {cj}j∈[ℓ], the responder needs to calculate square
roots of y2 = x3 + ax + b over the field Zp for prime
p. If p ≡4 3, then (y2)
p+1
4 immediately gives the solution.
However, if p ≡4 1, then one needs to use other less efficient
algorithms to find the solution and, unfortunately, secp224r1
(NIST P-224) happens to be this case. Query generation
involves no point decompression and so is not subject to this
peculiarity.
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(a) Mean query and response computation times (χ ≤ 6%)
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(b) Query message size (χ < 0.02%)
Fig. 7: Resource usage for various elliptic curves and numbers
n of similar passwords
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